Oceangate Titan submarine tragedy ‘to be stopped,’ Coast Guard receives report

A new report on the Titan submersible disaster killed five people, which revealed that the tragedy was to be stopped, and ignored the result and safety warning of a flawed experimental design – especially placed on the Oceangate CEO Stockton Rush.

The 335-foot report by the US Coast Guard (USCG) is the first full government post-mortem on the tragedy to date and the first official document, which clearly blames Oceangate, which now convicts the sick vessel’s operators and rush.

The report runs as a architect of paints submarine failure, who described the warnings of engineers about the flawed design of the vessel, which eventually implicated the vessel near the Titanic debris in the North Atlantic Ocean in 2023, resulting in immediate death of all five occupants.

The video shows that the wife of Oceangate’s CEO has reacted after the sound that Titan is now all Employed.

Rush, who was piloting Titan, when he dropped about 11,000 feet below the Atlantic Ocean, insisted on using a five -inch coarse carbon fiber hull despite the failed model tests and opposition from the industry. Submersible viewport was rated for a depth of only 2,130 feet, which is less than 12,500 feet required to reach the Titanic.

“This was a sea -caste and loss of five people with the USCG Titan Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) President Jason Nubore. “The two -year investigation has identified several contributors, which were caused by this tragedy, providing valuable lessons learned to prevent future phenomenon.”

Previous reports focused on the technical cause of Titan’s transplantation, but stopped lower from blaming.

The report found that Mr. Rush kept complete control over every aspect of the company’s operations and engineering decisions … refusal to prioritize security and his major leadership style created an atmosphere where Titan’s final implant became almost a certainty. ,

The board determined that primary contribution was factors, inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process of Ocegate were for Titan. Other factors included a toxic workplace culture in Oceangate, weak safety rules for deep sea like Titan-especially using new or experimental designs-and a broken system to protect employees who tried to speak.

Titan faced a horrificness due to the structural failure of its carbon fiber composite pressure hull and the carbon fiber hull showed symptoms of fatigue and deviation in the test before a deadly daw. While Oceangate engineers and advisors raised serious concerns about their safety margin, they were ignored or sidelined by Rush, according to reports.

Titan submersible tail cones on the ocean floor

“In the context of the design and construction of Titan’s carbon fiber hull, curved, treatment, gluing, thickness and manufacturing standards, the Titan’s carbon fiber hull, introduced flaws that weaken the overall structural integrity of the Titan plow,” the report said. “Carbon fiber pressure hull faced a complete material collapse due to its final dive.”

Many red flags were raised in the previous dives, but Rush continued Titan, dismissed the internal warning and hidden significant damage from the crew and customers, found in the report.

For example, in the 2019 dive, more than 150 loud rudder-crossing noise was heard, indicating a progressive decline. A four-foot crack was later found in the original plow, which was de-rested after the pressure test-motivating Ocenegate to create a new one. However, during the development of the two hulls, four one-third-scale model was tested and all of them were implicated under pressure, stating that carbon fiber design was unstable.

Additionally, Titan’s forward dome-one was designed to secure a 3,500-pound pressure-bearing ingredient-co-co-co-co-co-co-co-co-co-co-co-co-co-co-co-co-coon, but Rush used only four bolts, according to the testimony of the engineering director of Oceangate at that time.

During the Titanic dive of 2021, four safe bolts of Titan were shear during riding on the horizon arctic, which led to the launch of the front dome in a terrible mechanical failure and dropped on the recovery system platform, which survived the driver’s team.

The report found that Oceangate sidelined the industry-standard certification, ignored its own health, safety and environment (HSE) manual and promoted a culture that suppressed security concerns.

The report stated, “Oceangate followed the safety standards mentioned in its HSE manual and promoted the culture of transparency and accountability, this tragedy would probably be well removed from service with the final Titan hull, which was well removed before its implications,” reported in the report.

“Encouraging employees to give voice to the employees without fears of vengeance and prioritizing security safety can prevent the sequence of incidents caused by disaster. Instead, the company’s systemic failures created an environment where the risks were ignored, and the results were unavoidable.”

Along with Rush, UK billionaire Hamish Harding, French merrinner Paul-Henry Nareglet and father-son pair Shahzada Dawood and Suleman Dawood were also killed in the disaster.

While passengers signed the discount, they were not fully informed about the experimental engineering degree or pre -red flag degree.

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Newer said that strong oversite for operators and clear options that are discovering new concepts in the discovery of deep sea.

American regulatory officials like USCG and NTSB lacked jurisdiction as Titan operated in international water and was registered in Bahamas. The report called for a new law to expand the US Oversite Authority on the deep sea commercial submersibles carrying American citizens.

MBI called for new international security standards, referring to depressed passenger ships at extreme depth, referring to a possible legal violation to a National Submersible Registry and Justice Department.